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    Griffin's view may not be genuinely monist at the foundat... — Carmelics
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    Griffin's view may not be genuinely monist at the foundational level

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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Griffin's 'informed desire' constraint appeals to objective facts about human nature to filter desires, introducing a naturalistic standard independent of desire itself.
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    • 2.When a filtering criterion derives from a source categorically distinct from the filtered items, the theory is foundationally dual, not monist, per Parfit's analysis in Reasons and Persons.
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    • 3.A view is genuinely monist only if its foundational value-conferring property is self-sufficient and requires no external normative standard to specify it.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Griffin explicitly invokes 'prudential values' like accomplishment and deep personal relations as constraints on which desires count, echoing objective list elements identified by Finnis and Raz.
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    • 2.Invoking objective prudential values as gatekeepers for desire satisfaction means the objective values do normative work prior to and independently of desire satisfaction.
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    • 3.When the explanatory and justificatory priority runs from objective values to desires rather than vice versa, the desire-satisfaction framework is derivative, confirming foundational pluralism.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.A genuinely monist desire satisfaction view would place no constraints on which desires are value-conferring
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    • 2.An unconstrained desire satisfaction view is implausible
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    • 3.Adding constraints to qualify which desires confer value may introduce foundational pluralism
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    Related

    A genuinely monist desire satisfaction view would place no constraints on which ...A view is genuinely monist only if its foundational value-conferring property is...Adding constraints to qualify which desires confer value may introduce foundatio...An unconstrained desire satisfaction view is implausible
    +5 moreShow less
    Griffin explicitly invokes 'prudential values' like accomplishment and deep pers...Griffin's 'informed desire' constraint appeals to objective facts about human na...Invoking objective prudential values as gatekeepers for desire satisfaction mean...When a filtering criterion derives from a source categorically distinct from the...When the explanatory and justificatory priority runs from objective values to de...

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: value-pluralism
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    However, it is not entirely clear that a view like Griffin’s is genuinely monist at the foundational level: the question arises, what is constraining the desires that qualify as value conferring? If the answer is ‘nothing’, then the view seems genuinely monist, but is probably implausible. Unconstrained desire accounts of value seem implausible because our desires can be for all sorts of things—we may desire things that are bad for us, or we may desire things because of some mistake we have mad
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit