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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Griffin's view may not be genuinely monist at the foundational level

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A genuinely monist desire satisfaction view would place no constraints on which desires are value-conferring
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    • 2.An unconstrained desire satisfaction view is implausible
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    • 3.Adding constraints to qualify which desires confer value may introduce foundational pluralism
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Griffin's 'informed desire' constraint appeals to objective facts about human nature to filter desires, introducing a naturalistic standard independent of desire itself.
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    • 2.When a filtering criterion derives from a source categorically distinct from the filtered items, the theory is foundationally dual, not monist, per Parfit's analysis in Reasons and Persons.
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    • 3.A view is genuinely monist only if its foundational value-conferring property is self-sufficient and requires no external normative standard to specify it.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Griffin explicitly invokes 'prudential values' like accomplishment and deep personal relations as constraints on which desires count, echoing objective list elements identified by Finnis and Raz.
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    • 2.Invoking objective prudential values as gatekeepers for desire satisfaction means the objective values do normative work prior to and independently of desire satisfaction.
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    • 3.When the explanatory and justificatory priority runs from objective values to desires rather than vice versa, the desire-satisfaction framework is derivative, confirming foundational pluralism.
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