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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Having the relevant freedom does not always require an ability to do otherwise in the present, but it does require an ability to have done otherwise at various times in one's life history with respect to character- or motive-forming acts.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hard incompatibilists like Derk Pereboom argue that causal determinism eliminates genuine sourcehood even across a life history of character-forming acts.
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    • 2.If the causal antecedents of character-forming acts trace back to factors wholly outside the agent's control, no diachronic ability to do otherwise constitutes genuine freedom.
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    • 3.Therefore, requiring only past alternative possibilities fails to establish the robust sourcehood needed for the kind of freedom that would justify eternal consequences.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt cases demonstrate that moral responsibility is compatible with the absence of alternative possibilities, even at character-forming moments.
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    • 2.If responsibility requires no alternative possibilities in synchronic cases, extending this requirement diachronically is an ad hoc and unmotivated restriction.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • Agents with free will must be such that they could have done otherwise on some occasions of their life histories with respect to some character- or motive-forming acts by which they make themselves into the kinds of persons they are.
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