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    Having the relevant freedom does not always require an ab... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Having the relevant freedom does not always require an ability to do otherwise in the present, but it does require an ability to have done otherwise at various times in one's life history with respect to character- or motive-forming acts.

    Afterlife & DeathEternal Conscious Torment
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • Agents with free will must be such that they could have done otherwise on some occasions of their life histories with respect to some character- or motive-forming acts by which they make themselves into the kinds of persons they are.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hard incompatibilists like Derk Pereboom argue that causal determinism eliminates genuine sourcehood even across a life history of character-forming acts.
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    • 2.If the causal antecedents of character-forming acts trace back to factors wholly outside the agent's control, no diachronic ability to do otherwise constitutes genuine freedom.
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    • 3.Therefore, requiring only past alternative possibilities fails to establish the robust sourcehood needed for the kind of freedom that would justify eternal consequences.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frankfurt cases demonstrate that moral responsibility is compatible with the absence of alternative possibilities, even at character-forming moments.
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    • 2.If responsibility requires no alternative possibilities in synchronic cases, extending this requirement diachronically is an ad hoc and unmotivated restriction.
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    Topics

    Afterlife & DeathEternal Conscious Torment

    Key Terms

    Character-forming acts(as used in ethics and philosophy of action)
    Actions that shape who you are as a person—like choices you make that develop your habits, values, and personality over time.
    Freedom (in philosophy)(as used in ethics and metaphysics)
    The ability to make genuine choices that aren't completely controlled by outside forces or your past—it's about having real agency in your decisions.
    Motive-forming acts(as used in ethics and philosophy of action)
    Actions that create or shape your desires, intentions, and reasons for doing things in the future.
    ability to do otherwise(Standard criterion in free will debates; the compatibilist rejects this as a necessary condition for freedom)
    The capacity of an agent, at the point of action with all circumstances held constant, to have acted differently than they did.
    free will(Kant's practical resolution of the third antinomy)
    An exemption from the laws of nature; the power of doing and forbearing

    Related

    Agents with free will must be such that they could have done otherwise on some o...Frankfurt cases demonstrate that moral responsibility is compatible with the abs...Hard incompatibilists like Derk Pereboom argue that causal determinism eliminate...If responsibility requires no alternative possibilities in synchronic cases, ext...
    +2 moreShow less
    If the causal antecedents of character-forming acts trace back to factors wholly...Therefore, requiring only past alternative possibilities fails to establish the ...

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: heaven-hell
    View source passageHide passage
    Given the New Testament imagery associated with Gehenna, the Lake of Fire, and the outer darkness—where there is “weeping and gnashing of teeth”—the question is not how someone in a context of ambiguity, ignorance, and misperception could freely choose separation from the divine nature over union with it; the question is instead how someone could both experience such separation (or the unbearable misery of hell, for example) and freely choose to remain in such a state forever. This is not a problem for the Augustinians because, according to them, the damned have no further choice in the matter...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

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