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    Hyperintensional distinctions between necessarily equival... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Hyperintensional distinctions between necessarily equivalent propositions are impossible.

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Necessarily equivalent propositions C and D, if treated as distinct, lead via negation to the conclusion that C and D are identical.
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    • 2.This reductio shows that no hyperintensional distinction between necessarily equivalent propositions can be coherently maintained.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Propositional attitude verbs like 'believes' and 'knows' create contexts where substitution of necessarily equivalent terms fails (Frege's puzzle).
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    • 2.If 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' are necessarily equivalent yet differ in cognitive significance, propositional content must be finer-grained than necessity.
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    • 3.Therefore, the identity of propositions cannot be grounded solely in necessary equivalence without collapsing the semantics of intentional contexts.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Possible worlds semantics identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, but this framework provably cannot distinguish logically equivalent mathematical truths like Fermat's Last Theorem from Goldbach's Conjecture.
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    • 2.Truthmaker theory (Fine, Armstrong) individuates propositions by their ontological grounds, not their truth conditions across worlds, permitting distinct propositions to be necessarily co-true.
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    • 3.The reductio in the supporting argument assumes a possible-worlds individuation criterion for propositions, which is precisely what hyperintensionalists reject rather than derive.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    If 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' are necessarily equivalen...Necessarily equivalent propositions C and D, if treated as distinct, lead via ne...Possible worlds semantics identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, ...Propositional attitude verbs like 'believes' and 'knows' create contexts where s...
    +4 moreShow less
    The reductio in the supporting argument assumes a possible-worlds individuation ...Therefore, the identity of propositions cannot be grounded solely in necessary e...This reductio shows that no hyperintensional distinction between necessarily equ...Truthmaker theory (Fine, Armstrong) individuates propositions by their ontologic...

    Similar

    Facts corresponding to non-equivalent propositions are distinct from o...88%Any theory allowing distinct necessarily equivalent propositions is un...88%Any two necessarily equivalent sentences express the same proposition.85%This reductio shows that no hyperintensional distinction between neces...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: hyperintensionality
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    The objection, presented in Cresswell (2002) against structured propositions and suggested by Stalnaker (1996) against impossible worlds, can be illustrated by focusing on the meaning of negation. Given a statement \(A\), what truth-conditions can we offer for \({\sim}A\)? Plausibly, the truth conditions can be exhausted by specifying that \({\sim}A\) is true when \(A\) is false, and not otherwise. Since this exhausts the meaning of “\({\sim}\)”, it is tempting to identify the proposition \({\si
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit