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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Hyperintensional distinctions between necessarily equivalent propositions are impossible.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Propositional attitude verbs like 'believes' and 'knows' create contexts where substitution of necessarily equivalent terms fails (Frege's puzzle).
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    • 2.If 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' are necessarily equivalent yet differ in cognitive significance, propositional content must be finer-grained than necessity.
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    • 3.Therefore, the identity of propositions cannot be grounded solely in necessary equivalence without collapsing the semantics of intentional contexts.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Possible worlds semantics identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, but this framework provably cannot distinguish logically equivalent mathematical truths like Fermat's Last Theorem from Goldbach's Conjecture.
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    • 2.Truthmaker theory (Fine, Armstrong) individuates propositions by their ontological grounds, not their truth conditions across worlds, permitting distinct propositions to be necessarily co-true.
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    • 3.The reductio in the supporting argument assumes a possible-worlds individuation criterion for propositions, which is precisely what hyperintensionalists reject rather than derive.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Necessarily equivalent propositions C and D, if treated as distinct, lead via negation to the conclusion that C and D are identical.
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    • 2.This reductio shows that no hyperintensional distinction between necessarily equivalent propositions can be coherently maintained.
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