Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    If a strongly necessary being such as Allah exists, then ... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    If a strongly necessary being such as Allah exists, then certain singular logical truths—such as 'something exists if Allah exists'—are themselves strongly necessary.

    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.By axiom S3, if a strongly necessary being exists, then singular logical truths entailed by that being's existence are n-statable.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.What is n-statable is strongly necessary.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Logical truth is grounded in logical form alone, not in the existence of any particular being, however necessary.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A truth like 'something exists if Allah exists' is a material conditional whose necessity derives from logical structure, not from Allah's modal status.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Deriving the strong necessity of a logical truth from a being's necessity conflates the source of modal force with the content of the proposition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's semantics for S5 shows that necessary existence requires truth across all possible worlds, but S3 is a strictly weaker system that cannot license such strong modal closure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the axiom base is S3 rather than S5, singular truths entailed by a being's existence inherit only the modal strength S3 licenses, which falls short of strong necessity as standardly defined by Plantinga and others.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Divine AttributesModality & Possibility

    Related

    A truth like 'something exists if Allah exists' is a material conditional whose ...By axiom S3, if a strongly necessary being exists, then singular logical truths ...Deriving the strong necessity of a logical truth from a being's necessity confla...If the axiom base is S3 rather than S5, singular truths entailed by a being's ex...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kripke's semantics for S5 shows that necessary existence requires truth across a...Logical truth is grounded in logical form alone, not in the existence of any par...What is n-statable is strongly necessary.

    Similar

    By axiom S3, if a strongly necessary being exists, then singular logic...88%No singular logical truth is provably strongly necessary in the logica...85%There exists a necessary being (God) that grounds facts about real pos...84%Therefore, establishing that God's existence is not impossible is suff...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: possibilism-actualism
    View source passageHide passage
    Of course, if in fact there is a (strongly) necessary being—Allah, say—then, by S3, some singular logical truths—e.g., something exists if Allah exists, \(\exists \sfx\,\sfx=\sfa \to \exists \sfx\,\sfx=\sfx\)—will be n-statable and, hence, (strongly) necessary. But no such truths are provably n-statable in Q, as \(\rS \tau\) is not a theorem of Q, for any term \(\tau\) and, hence, by S2, neither is \(\rS \varphi\) for any formula \(\varphi\) in which \(\tau\) is free. Thus, not only are all whol
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit