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    If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under co... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under conditions where (C,C) and (D,D) are both Nash Equilibria, the correct description is that the Prisoner's Dilemma was the wrong model of their situation, not that they played non-Nash Equilibrium strategies in a Prisoner's Dilemma.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The game in question has two Nash Equilibria: (C,C) and (D,D).
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    • 2.A game with Nash Equilibria at both (C,C) and (D,D) is an Assurance game, not a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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    • 3.In a Prisoner's Dilemma, (C,C) is not a Nash Equilibrium.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Game models are not straightforwardly read off from payoff structures; they are theoretical idealizations that can misdescribe situations while remaining the intended model.
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    • 2.Binmore and others in behavioral game theory hold that players can deviate from Nash Equilibria within a correctly specified game due to bounded rationality or social norms.
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    • 3.If (C,C) arises in a PD through repeated interaction or reputation effects, the stage-game remains a PD even if equilibrium play differs from single-shot predictions.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The argument conflates the descriptive adequacy of a model with its identity: a Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by its ordinal payoff ranking, not by which equilibria are reached.
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    • 2.Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract shows agents achieving (C,C) in genuine PD structures through correlated equilibria, without this implying the game was misidentified.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    (C,C) and (D,D)(game theory notation)
    Shorthand notation where C stands for 'cooperate' and D stands for 'defect' (betray); (C,C) means both players cooperate, while (D,D) means both betray.
    Game theory(mathematics and philosophy)
    The mathematical study of strategic interactions where each person's outcome depends not just on their own choices, but on what other people choose to do.
    Nash equilibrium(Applied here to the pair of uniform randomizing strategies in the fugitive-pursuer bridge game.)
    A combination of strategies in which neither player can improve their expected outcome by unilaterally deviating, given the other player's strategy.
    Prisoner's Dilemma(Popular discussion context)
    A scenario in which two players are separated so they cannot communicate, and each must decide whether to confess or refuse, facing incentives that lead to suboptimal collective outcomes.

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A game with Nash Equilibria at both (C,C) and (D,D) is an Assurance game, not a ...Binmore and others in behavioral game theory hold that players can deviate from ...Describing players as having played non-Nash Equilibrium strategies presupposes ...Game models are not straightforwardly read off from payoff structures; they are ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    This is no longer a PD; it is an Assurance game, which has two NE at (C,C) and (D,D), with the former being Pareto superior to the latter. Thus if the players find this equilibrium, we should not say that they have played non-NE strategies in a PD. Rather, we should say that the PD was the wrong model of their situation.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    +6 moreShow less
    If (C,C) arises in a PD through repeated interaction or reputation effects, the ...If the game structure does not match the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Prisoner's Dile...In a Prisoner's Dilemma, (C,C) is not a Nash Equilibrium.Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract shows agents achieving (C,...The argument conflates the descriptive adequacy of a model with its identity: a ...The game in question has two Nash Equilibria: (C,C) and (D,D).

    Similar

    Describing players as having played non-Nash Equilibrium strategies pr...86%Rational play of a Nash equilibrium strategy presupposes that other pl...82%Predicting play consistent with QRE is motivated by the view that Nash...81%A player has no reason to play a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she ...80%
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