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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under conditions where (C,C) and (D,D) are both Nash Equilibria, the correct description is that the Prisoner's Dilemma was the wrong model of their situation, not that they played non-Nash Equilibrium strategies in a Prisoner's Dilemma.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Game models are not straightforwardly read off from payoff structures; they are theoretical idealizations that can misdescribe situations while remaining the intended model.
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    • 2.Binmore and others in behavioral game theory hold that players can deviate from Nash Equilibria within a correctly specified game due to bounded rationality or social norms.
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    • 3.If (C,C) arises in a PD through repeated interaction or reputation effects, the stage-game remains a PD even if equilibrium play differs from single-shot predictions.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The argument conflates the descriptive adequacy of a model with its identity: a Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by its ordinal payoff ranking, not by which equilibria are reached.
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    • 2.Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract shows agents achieving (C,C) in genuine PD structures through correlated equilibria, without this implying the game was misidentified.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The game in question has two Nash Equilibria: (C,C) and (D,D).
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    • 2.A game with Nash Equilibria at both (C,C) and (D,D) is an Assurance game, not a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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    • 3.In a Prisoner's Dilemma, (C,C) is not a Nash Equilibrium.
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