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    If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in t... — Carmelics
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    Supports→A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself, given that a first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.

    If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself.

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    Topics

    Divine AttributesAgainst an aspect of God

    Key Terms

    causally sufficient condition(Gomes's account of causal conditionals)
    'A' is a causally sufficient condition for 'B' when 'A' specifies the occurrence of an event that would cause another event 'B', by stating a condition the truth of which is sufficient for inferring the truth of 'B'.
    concrete object(Foundational primitive in Zalta's system)
    An object that actually exists in the sense captured by the existence predicate E!x; taken as primitive.

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    contingent being(Boethius's characterization of human beings to counter necessity-based arguments)
    A being whose existence is not necessary — it can fail to exist
    necessary condition(Counterfactual analysis of causation; Mackie 1965, 1974)
    A condition C is necessary for event E if E would not have occurred in the absence of C

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one co...The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the ex...

    Similar

    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at le...97%A second god cannot be a causally sufficient condition (in the strong ...97%If the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of...95%The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense)...93%

    Source

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    SEP: monotheism
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    (1*) is sufficient to yield our conclusion. For if the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object, then the second god is not a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of any contingent being. Similarly, if the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete ob

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