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    If the self-reflection grounding moral obligation is idea... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    If the self-reflection grounding moral obligation is idealized, then everyday reflective choice is insufficient to confer moral status.

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's transcendental unity of apperception requires a legislating rational will that transcends empirical psychological states, not mere contingent preference-reflection.
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    • 2.Ordinary introspective choice remains bound to inclination and causal history, failing to achieve the self-legislating autonomy Kant identifies as the ground of dignity.
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    • 3.Korsgaard's constitutivism inherits this Kantian demand: the normative authority of practical identity requires reflective endorsement from a standpoint purified of heteronomous influence.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical account shows that mere first-order reflection lacks authority unless grounded in a wholeheartedly endorsed higher-order volition, establishing a structural gap between everyday and normatively sufficient reflection.
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    • 2.A reflective capacity that can be defeated by weakness of will, self-deception, or adaptive preference formation cannot serve as the unconditional ground moral status requires.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Korsgaard's account is ambiguous about whether the self-reflection grounding obligation is idealized or ordinary.
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    • 2.If the relevant capacity is the idealized ability to reflect rationally in a full sense, then ordinary everyday reflection does not meet the threshold.
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    • 3.Moral status on this view would require the more rarified rational capacity, not mere introspection and choice.
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    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    Related

    A reflective capacity that can be defeated by weakness of will, self-deception, ...Frankfurt's hierarchical account shows that mere first-order reflection lacks au...If the relevant capacity is the idealized ability to reflect rationally in a ful...Kant's transcendental unity of apperception requires a legislating rational will...
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    Korsgaard's account is ambiguous about whether the self-reflection grounding obl...Korsgaard's constitutivism inherits this Kantian demand: the normative authority...Moral status on this view would require the more rarified rational capacity, not...Ordinary introspective choice remains bound to inclination and causal history, f...

    Similar

    Equal moral status cannot be grounded in reflective capacity alone, be...85%Korsgaard's account is ambiguous about whether the self-reflection gro...82%We have little reason to dismiss the possibility of autonomous moral r...82%Street claims that moral reflection is limited to assessing 'thoroughl...81%

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    SEP: autonomy-moral
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    The move that must be made here, I think, picks up on Korsgaard’s gloss on Kantianism and the argument that our reflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and, in turn, others’ obligations to regard us as moral equals. Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity as well — the ability to reflectively consider options and choose sensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning the ambiguities of Korsgaard’s account concerning the degree to
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit