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    Moral status on this view would require the more rarified... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Challenges→If the self-reflection grounding moral obligation is idealized, then everyday reflective choice is insufficient to confer moral status.

    Moral status on this view would require the more rarified rational capacity, not mere introspection and choice.

    Moral ResponsibilityRights & Liberty
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    The move that must be made here, I think, picks up on Korsgaard’s gloss on Kantianism and the argument that our reflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and, in turn, others’ obligations to regard us as moral equals. Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity as well — the ability to reflectively consider options and choose sensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning the ambiguities of Korsgaard’s account concerning the degree to

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