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    In a Bratman case, the agent's actions are driven by inte... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    In a Bratman case, the agent's actions are driven by intentions to try to perform each action rather than intentions to perform each action outright

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeMoral Responsibility
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.In a Bratman case, the agent merely intends to try to φ and intends to try to Θ
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    • 2.These intentions to try are what causally drive the agent's actions
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's account of intention-in-action holds that the proximate cause of action is an all-out judgment that one should act, not a hedged intention to try.
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    • 2.If intentions to try were the operative causal driver, akratic action would be impossible, yet akrasia demonstrably occurs when agents act against their all-out evaluative judgments.
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    • 3.Therefore the causal role attributed to 'intentions to try' conflates the deliberative stage with the executive stage of intentional action.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Bratman himself argues that intentions are future-directed plans, not merely attempts, and that plan-intentions guide action through practical reasoning toward completion.
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    • 2.An agent who forms a plan-intention to φ is committed to φ-ing outright, not merely to trying, since trying without commitment to success fails to constitute genuine planning.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

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    Causation1 linked

    Related

    An agent who forms a plan-intention to φ is committed to φ-ing outright, not mer...Bratman himself argues that intentions are future-directed plans, not merely att...Davidson's account of intention-in-action holds that the proximate cause of acti...If intentions to try were the operative causal driver, akratic action would be i...
    +3 moreShow less
    In a Bratman case, the agent merely intends to try to φ and intends to try to ΘTherefore the causal role attributed to 'intentions to try' conflates the delibe...These intentions to try are what causally drive the agent's actions

    Similar

    Knowing an agent's intentions explains why the agent persists in pursu...88%These intentions to try are what causally drive the agent's actions86%An agent is only obligated to perform an action if there exists a comb...85%When an agent acts for a reason, he acts motivated by an end he desire...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: action
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    Even if Bratman's argument defeats the Simple View [see McCann 1986, Knobe 2006], it doesn't rule out some type of causal analysis of acting intentionally; it doesn't even rule out such an analysis that takes the crucial controlling cause to be an intention in every instance. One might suppose, for example, that (i) in a Bratman case, the agent merely intends to try to φ and intends to try to Θ, and that (ii) it is these intentions that drive the agent's actions [Mele 1997]. The analysis in (7**
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit