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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Intentionality does not pose insurmountable semantic problems.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Paraphrasing 'Joe desires a unicorn' into sentential form presupposes a determinate propositional content, but de re intentional states resist reduction to any fixed sentence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Kripke's puzzle about belief shows that substituting co-referential names within belief contexts produces contradictions no sentential paraphrase strategy can dissolve without further theoretical cost.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A paraphrase that eliminates intentional objects only succeeds if the agent's mental state already has fully determinate propositional structure, which Chisholm's irreducibility thesis contests.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Brentano's thesis that intentionality constitutes an irreducible mark of the mental entails that no purely extensional or physicalist semantic apparatus can fully capture directedness toward objects.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The 'believes-true S' schema inherits the inscrutability of reference problem: Quine's arguments show no fact of the matter determines which sentence S correctly captures the content of a belief state.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Sentences like 'Joe desires a unicorn' can be paraphrased as 'Joe desires-true of himself "possesses a unicorn"', eliminating the need for the intentional object to exist.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.More generally, 'Joe believes-true S' or 'Joe desires-true S' where S is a sentence handles intentional contexts without requiring the existence of the object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.