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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Mary the super color scientist lacks understanding of what it is like to experience red despite her complete physical knowledge of color

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mary's new knowledge upon release is best explained as gaining a new ability—to recognize, remember, and imagine red—rather than acquiring a new propositional fact.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Ability knowledge (knowing-how) does not constitute a distinct ontological category of fact beyond physical facts, so no non-physical fact is revealed.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The knowledge argument therefore establishes only a difference in modes of access to physical information, not a gap in the physical information itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal concepts are distinct modes of presentation that refer to physical brain states under an intrinsic, non-relational guise unavailable from third-person description.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mary acquires a new phenomenal concept of red-experience upon release, but this concept and the physical state it denotes are identical—no new non-physical property is instantiated.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The appearance of an explanatory gap between Mary's old and new knowledge is a cognitive illusion produced by the special first-person character of phenomenal concepts, not evidence of qualia as non-physical entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Mary has an impoverished history of achromatic visual experience and has never seen red
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Understanding the what-it's-likeness of experiencing red requires having had or undergone relevantly similar visual experiences
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Third-person theoretical knowledge of color, however complete, cannot substitute for first-person experiential knowledge
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.