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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Metaphysical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agent's ability to perform an action

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dispositional ability analyses (e.g., Ryle, Fara) ground abilities entirely in actual behavioral dispositions, making metaphysical possibility neither necessary nor sufficient.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A fragile vase has the metaphysical possibility of surviving a fall but lacks any disposition toward survival, showing possibility tracks ability only accidentally.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Frankfurt's mesh theories of freedom, an agent's ability is constituted by the alignment of first- and second-order volitions, not by modal facts about what is possible.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Modal accessibility across possible worlds is silent on the internal volitional structure that Frankfurt argues is the actual ground of genuine agentive ability.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.For an agent S to have an ability to perform action A, it is necessary that it be possible that S does A
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.There are metaphysically possible acts that an agent nonetheless cannot perform, showing possibility is not sufficient
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.