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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Moral particularists can legitimately learn from other ca... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Moral particularists can legitimately learn from other cases without committing to cross-case necessity.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.It is permissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case might matter in another, prompting further investigation.
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    • 2.It is impermissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case must matter in another.
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    • 3.The weaker inference ('might matter') preserves openness to what the new case actually reveals.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'might matter' inference is cognitively idle unless underwritten by some implicit generalization about why the feature mattered before.
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    • 2.Any principled account of why a feature is worth investigating in a new case implicitly commits to a proto-principle linking feature-types to moral relevance.
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    • 3.A particularism that secretly relies on such proto-principles is not genuinely particularist but merely a disguised form of moderate generalism (cf. Dancy's critics, e.g. Hooker in 'Moral Particularism: Wrong Method').
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) requires perceiving morally salient features as instances of stable character-relevant kinds, not as brute particulars.
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    • 2.If cross-case learning yields no reliable generalizations, the virtuous agent cannot develop the stable perceptual dispositions that constitute moral expertise on Aristotle's account.
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    • 3.A learning model that forecloses necessity therefore undermines the developmental account of moral perception central to virtue ethics (cf. McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason').
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    A learning model that forecloses necessity therefore undermines the developmenta...A particularism that secretly relies on such proto-principles is not genuinely p...Any principled account of why a feature is worth investigating in a new case imp...Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) requires perceiving morally salient fe...
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    If cross-case learning yields no reliable generalizations, the virtuous agent ca...It is impermissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case must matt...It is permissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case might matte...The 'might matter' inference is cognitively idle unless underwritten by some imp...The weaker inference ('might matter') preserves openness to what the new case ac...

    Similar

    A particularist can point to how things are in another, perhaps simple...83%Allowing relevance of other cases does not require committing to the g...77%Moral particularism requires understanding the particular natural feat...75%Moral disagreement between particularists is not reduced to mere subje...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-particularism
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    Particularists are fond of saying that generalists will make bad decisions. One reason for this is that generalism seems to validate certain patterns of argument that particularists would think of as invalid. For instance, a generalist might think ‘Feature F made a difference in that case; so it must make the same sort of difference here too’. If our decision in the second case was influenced by such ‘reasoning’, it would have been influenced by a mistake, according to the particularist. Particu
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit