Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Moral particularists can legitimately learn from other cases without committing to cross-case necessity.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'might matter' inference is cognitively idle unless underwritten by some implicit generalization about why the feature mattered before.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Any principled account of why a feature is worth investigating in a new case implicitly commits to a proto-principle linking feature-types to moral relevance.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A particularism that secretly relies on such proto-principles is not genuinely particularist but merely a disguised form of moderate generalism (cf. Dancy's critics, e.g. Hooker in 'Moral Particularism: Wrong Method').
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis) requires perceiving morally salient features as instances of stable character-relevant kinds, not as brute particulars.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If cross-case learning yields no reliable generalizations, the virtuous agent cannot develop the stable perceptual dispositions that constitute moral expertise on Aristotle's account.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A learning model that forecloses necessity therefore undermines the developmental account of moral perception central to virtue ethics (cf. McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason').
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.It is permissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case might matter in another, prompting further investigation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.It is impermissible to infer that a feature which mattered in one case must matter in another.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The weaker inference ('might matter') preserves openness to what the new case actually reveals.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.