Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Natural agreement with a thing is sufficient for a though... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Truth can obtain in the simple operation of the intellect (apprehension of quiddities), not only in composite operations (composition and division).

    Natural agreement with a thing is sufficient for a thought to be true.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Philosophy of Language
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Agreement (adequatio) with things is the criterion for a thought being true.The intellectual apprehension of a quiddity is naturally in agreement with that ...Truth can obtain in the simple operation of the intellect (apprehension of quidd...

    Similar

    Agreement (adequatio) with things is the criterion for a thought being...80%When no contradiction is perceived, assent comes readily.78%If a proposition is known to be true solely because it is clearly and ...78%If a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments about the same...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: simon-faversham
    View source passageHide passage
    Simon accepts the common medieval definition of a true thought as one that is in agreement (adequatio) with things, an agreement determined by the way things are. However, unlike other thirteenth-century masters of arts (e.g., Robert Kilwardby and Radulphus Brito), Simon maintains that this agreement concerns the second, and composite, operation of the intellect—composition and division—as well as the first, and simple, one—the apprehension of quiddities (In Perih.: q.6). Hence, while other mast

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective