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    The intellectual apprehension of a quiddity is naturally ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Truth can obtain in the simple operation of the intellect (apprehension of quiddities), not only in composite operations (composition and division).

    The intellectual apprehension of a quiddity is naturally in agreement with that quiddity.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Agreement (adequatio) with things is the criterion for a thought being true.Natural agreement with a thing is sufficient for a thought to be true.Truth can obtain in the simple operation of the intellect (apprehension of quidd...

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    SEP: simon-faversham
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    Simon accepts the common medieval definition of a true thought as one that is in agreement (adequatio) with things, an agreement determined by the way things are. However, unlike other thirteenth-century masters of arts (e.g., Robert Kilwardby and Radulphus Brito), Simon maintains that this agreement concerns the second, and composite, operation of the intellect—composition and division—as well as the first, and simple, one—the apprehension of quiddities (In Perih.: q.6). Hence, while other mast

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