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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Naturalist moral epistemology fails to derive moral conclusions from purely non-normative premises

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Naturalists attempt to derive that an act is morally wrong from purely non-normative features of the act
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    • 2.Any such derivation depends on a suppressed premise that all acts with those non-normative features are morally wrong
      ?

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    • 3.The suppressed premise is itself a moral (normative) claim
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hume's guillotine establishes that 'is' statements cannot logically entail 'ought' statements without an irreducible normative bridge principle.
      ?

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    • 2.Every proposed naturalist bridge principle (e.g., 'what promotes flourishing ought to be done') reintroduces normative content, making the derivation circular.
      ?

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    • 3.G.E. Moore's open question argument shows that for any natural property F, 'X is F but is X good?' remains coherently askable, proving no purely descriptive predicate captures moral content.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Cornell realist attempts to identify moral properties with natural properties fail because, as Parfit argues in 'On What Matters,' such identifications smuggle in prior normative commitments about which natural properties matter morally.
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    • 2.Any selectivity about which non-normative facts ground moral conclusions presupposes a normative ranking criterion that cannot itself be derived from non-normative premises.
      ?

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