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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Necessitism, though a logical truth of SQML, is not analytically entailed by possibilism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Possibilism is committed to a fixed domain of possibilia that exists across all worlds, making every possible object necessarily existent in that domain.
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    • 2.If possibilia are ontologically basic constituents of modal space, their existence cannot be contingent without collapsing the distinction between actualism and possibilism.
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    • 3.David Lewis's modal realism, the paradigm possibilist framework, entails that every individual exists necessarily as a denizen of some world, making necessitism a structural consequence of the view.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The supporting argument conflates two senses of 'absence': being absent from a world's local domain versus failing to exist in the global possibilist ontology.
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    • 2.Williamson's necessitism in 'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' demonstrates that possibilism's quantifiers range over all possibilia at every world, so no possibile can be 'altogether absent' from the global domain.
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    • 3.If possibilism's ontology is world-invariant by design, then the conceptual room the supporting arguments claim for contingent possibilia is already closed off by the possibilist's own semantic commitments.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.There is nothing in the concept of a mere possibile that demands its necessity.
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    • 2.Nothing in the concept of a mere possibile rules out worlds from which that possibile might be altogether absent — worlds in which nothing is identical to it.
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