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    Neither (P) nor (N), on this view, entails the existence ... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivalent to a nominalist paraphrase sentence (N) and that neither entails the existence of a property.

    Neither (P) nor (N), on this view, entails the existence of Gness.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

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    On the paraphrase-nominalist view, (P) says the very same thing as (N).Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivale...

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    On this view, (P) is equivalent to (N). That is, it says the very same thing. And neither sentence, according to this view, entails the existence of Gness. We can call this a paraphrase-nominalist view of sentences like (P). But nominalists needn't endorse this view. They can also endorse a fictionalist view of sentences like (P). On this view, (P) and (N) do not, strictly speaking, say the same thing, because (P) talks about the property of Gness and (N) does not. According to this fictionalist

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