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    Not every qua-object of God is a divine Person. — Carmelics
    Home/Trinity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Not every qua-object of God is a divine Person.

    Trinity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Many qua-objects of God are contingent (e.g. God-as-creator, God-as-friend-of-Abraham), and such would not have existed had God not created.
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    • 2.Any qua-object of God which involves only an essential property of his (e.g. God-as-omnipotent) is numerically identical to God.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The three divine Persons are themselves essential properties of God on classical Trinitarian doctrine, not contingent relational features.
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    • 2.If Personhood is essential to God's nature, then God-qua-Father, God-qua-Son, and God-qua-Spirit are not relevantly different from God-as-omnipotent.
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    • 3.Therefore the distinction between essential and contingent qua-objects cannot by itself explain why some qua-objects are Persons and others are not.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Fine's theory of qua-objects, a qua-object x/P is distinct from x only when P is not constitutive of x's identity conditions.
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    • 2.Aquinas and the classical tradition hold that in God, esse and essentia are identical, making every real attribute constitutive of divine identity.
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    • 3.If every divine attribute is identity-constitutive, then no qua-object of God is genuinely distinct from God, collapsing the framework before the Person/non-Person distinction can be drawn.
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    Trinity

    Related

    Any qua-object of God which involves only an essential property of his (e.g. God...Aquinas and the classical tradition hold that in God, esse and essentia are iden...If Personhood is essential to God's nature, then God-qua-Father, God-qua-Son, an...If every divine attribute is identity-constitutive, then no qua-object of God is...
    +4 moreShow less
    Many qua-objects of God are contingent (e.g. God-as-creator, God-as-friend-of-Ab...On Fine's theory of qua-objects, a qua-object x/P is distinct from x only when P...The three divine Persons are themselves essential properties of God on classical...Therefore the distinction between essential and contingent qua-objects cannot by...

    Similar

    Each Person of the Trinity is divine.85%Each Person has all the divine attributes.82%The divine nature implies the existence of three relational qua-object...81%Christ is both fully human (a body-soul composite) and fully divine (G...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted3/3 agreementValid
    SEP: trinity
    Koons, as reported by the author
    View source passageHide passage
    One may ask why there should be only three qua-objects here, when objects like a human person or an apple, having many properties, might imply hundreds or thousands of qua-objects. The answer is that not every qua-object of God is a divine Person. Many such, Koons says, are contingent, e.g. God-as-creator, or God-as-friend-of-Abraham; such would not have existed had God not created. And any qua-object of God which involves only an essential property of his, e.g. God-as-omnipotent, is numerically identical to God (345). To be a “hypostatic qua-object” (i.e. a God-as-thing which is a divine Pers...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The passage explicitly states the conclusion and provides both premises as reasons why not every qua-object of God qualifies as a divine Person—contingent ones fail the necessity requirement and essential-property ones collapse into numerical identity with God.

    Confidence: Clearly stated reasoning for why the number of divine Persons is limited despite many properties.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit