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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Only human agents have the relevant mental attitudes requ... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Only human agents have the relevant mental attitudes required for intentional action

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Having intentional mental attitudes requires linguistic competence
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    • 2.Only humans possess linguistic competence
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Anscombe and Davidson ground intentional action in the structure of reasons-responsiveness, not linguistic expression per se.
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    • 2.A creature can be responsive to reasons and act accordingly even if it lacks the capacity to articulate those reasons in propositional language.
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    • 3.Therefore the inference from 'requires linguistic competence' to 'only humans qualify' conflates the vehicle of thought with its functional role.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Empirical studies show great apes, corvids, and cetaceans exhibit goal-directed behavior toward represented future states without language.
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    • 2.If non-linguistic creatures can represent goals and act to achieve them, linguistic competence is not necessary for intentional mental attitudes.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language2 linked

    Related

    A creature can be responsive to reasons and act accordingly even if it lacks the...Anscombe and Davidson ground intentional action in the structure of reasons-resp...Empirical studies show great apes, corvids, and cetaceans exhibit goal-directed ...Having intentional mental attitudes requires linguistic competence
    +3 moreShow less
    If non-linguistic creatures can represent goals and act to achieve them, linguis...Only humans possess linguistic competenceTherefore the inference from 'requires linguistic competence' to 'only humans qu...

    Similar

    The desire to act in accordance with reasons is the mental attitude fi...83%The desire to act in accordance with reasons is a mental attitude the ...82%Having intentional mental attitudes requires linguistic competence82%Behavior must be caused by an agent's beliefs and desires in order to ...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: agency
    View source passageHide passage
    We have a pervasive tendency to interpret and explain behavior in terms of intentional mental states. We tend, even, to interpret the interaction between animated objects in terms of desires, beliefs, and intentions (Heider and Simmel 1944). This raises the question of when it is appropriate to attribute mental states in the explanation of behavior. According to an instrumentalist stance (Dennett 1987: Ch. 2), the question of when it is appropriate to ascribe mental states cannot be separated fr
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit