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    The desire to act in accordance with reasons is the menta... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The desire to act in accordance with reasons is the mental attitude fit to play the role of the agent.

    Consciousness & MindFree Will & Foreknowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The standard theory fails because agents can disown the mental attitudes it posits.
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    • 2.Irreducible agent-causation is not an acceptable solution.
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    • 3.The only remaining strategy is to find a mental attitude the agent cannot disown.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt's hierarchical account shows that what makes an attitude the agent's own is identification via higher-order volitions, not inalienability.
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    • 2.A desire to act on reasons can itself be alienated if the agent lacks a higher-order endorsement of that very desire.
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    • 3.Therefore, the desire to act on reasons is not structurally different from other disownable attitudes and cannot uniquely constitute the agent.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Korsgaard's constitutivism requires that agency is grounded in self-constitution through practical identity, not in any single inalienable desire.
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    • 2.An agent who reflectively rejects their practical identity would thereby disown even the desire to act on reasons, rendering it disownable after all.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Moral Responsibility2 linkedCausation1 linked

    Related

    A desire to act on reasons can itself be alienated if the agent lacks a higher-o...A mental attitude that cannot be disowned is, functionally speaking, the agent.An agent who reflectively rejects their practical identity would thereby disown ...Frankfurt's hierarchical account shows that what makes an attitude the agent's o...
    +6 moreShow less
    Irreducible agent-causation is not an acceptable solution.Korsgaard's constitutivism requires that agency is grounded in self-constitution...The desire to act in accordance with reasons is a mental attitude the agent cann...

    Similar

    The desire to act in accordance with reasons is a mental attitude the ...93%Only human agents have the relevant mental attitudes required for inte...83%Behavior must be caused by an agent's beliefs and desires in order to ...83%A mental attitude that cannot be disowned is, functionally speaking, t...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: agency
    View source passageHide passage
    According to Velleman (1992), Frankfurt’s observation that an agent may fail to identify with a particular motive points to a fundamental flaw in the standard theory. As it seems always possible that an agent “disowns” the mental attitudes that cause an action, those attitudes do not “add up to the agent’s being involved” (1992: 463). This shows, according to Velleman, that the standard theory captures, at best, actions that are defective. It fails, in particular, to capture “human action par ex
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The only remaining strategy is to find a mental attitude the agent cannot disown...
    The standard theory fails because agents can disown the mental attitudes it posi...
    Therefore, the desire to act on reasons is not structurally different from other...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit