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    Only mind or spirit satisfies the ontological conditions ... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Only mind or spirit satisfies the ontological conditions for genuine substantiality

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Matter and mind are the only candidates for genuine substantiality of which we know
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    • 2.Matter does not satisfy the ontological conditions for genuine substantiality
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotelian hylomorphism holds that primary substances are concrete particulars—individual organisms—whose substantiality derives from form-matter composites, not from mentality.
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    • 2.The ontological conditions Berkeley and Leibniz invoke for substantiality (unity, activity, persistence) are satisfied by biological organisms without requiring those organisms to be mental entities.
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    • 3.Therefore, the disjunction in P1—matter or mind—falsely excludes hylomorphic composites as a third candidate that historically predates and independently challenges the idealist framework.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Spinoza's substance monism demonstrates that a single infinite substance with infinite attributes—neither purely mental nor material—satisfies classical criteria for substantiality (self-causation, necessary existence) without privileging mind.
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    • 2.If a substance need only be causa sui and conceivable through itself alone, then the idealist must provide additional criteria excluding neutral or physical monism, which they have not established.
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    Related

    Aristotelian hylomorphism holds that primary substances are concrete particulars...If a substance need only be causa sui and conceivable through itself alone, then...Matter and mind are the only candidates for genuine substantiality of which we k...Matter does not satisfy the ontological conditions for genuine substantiality
    +3 moreShow less
    Spinoza's substance monism demonstrates that a single infinite substance with in...The ontological conditions Berkeley and Leibniz invoke for substantiality (unity...Therefore, the disjunction in P1—matter or mind—falsely excludes hylomorphic com...

    Similar

    Matter and mind are the only candidates for genuine substantiality of ...87%Matter does not satisfy the ontological conditions for genuine substan...86%There might be some other alternative to matter and mind that also sat...84%McTaggart's argument for idealism rests on the claim that only mind or...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: idealism
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    in an ontological sense though, as he remarks, the terms “Spiritualism” or “Psychism” might be “intrinsically better” to characterize his point of view (NE §432). It is interesting to note that McTaggart does not believe that his metaphysical (ontological) spiritual idealism excludes a realistic stance in epistemology. This is so because he characterizes epistemological realism as a position that is based on a correspondence theory of truth according to which a belief is true if it corresponds t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit