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    Ontological reduction is distinct from epistemic reductio... — Carmelics
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    Ontological reduction is distinct from epistemic reduction in terms of the nature of its relata

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Epistemic reduction requires relata that are representational in nature
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    • 2.Ontological reduction requires relata that are non-representational entities
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Nagel's classic account treats reduction as a logical relation between theory-statements, yet this formal relation simultaneously constrains what ontological identities are permissible.
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    • 2.When epistemic reduction fixes truth conditions for bridge laws, it thereby determines the identity or constitution relations among the very entities ostensibly governed by ontological reduction.
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    • 3.If the same bridge-law structure does the work in both cases, the distinction in the nature of the relata collapses into a merely notational difference rather than a genuine categorical one.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Representational entities like theories and concepts are themselves ontological items in the world, blurring the representational/non-representational divide.
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    • 2.If theories are constituents of scientific practice and thus of reality, the relata of epistemic reduction are also non-representational in the relevant ontological sense.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Causation1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Epistemic reduction requires relata that are representational in natureIf the same bridge-law structure does the work in both cases, the distinction in...If theories are constituents of scientific practice and thus of reality, the rel...Nagel's classic account treats reduction as a logical relation between theory-st...
    +3 moreShow less
    Ontological reduction requires relata that are non-representational entitiesRepresentational entities like theories and concepts are themselves ontological ...When epistemic reduction fixes truth conditions for bridge laws, it thereby dete...

    Similar

    Representational reduction (Van Gulick 2001) is equivalent to epistemi...90%An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the int...86%Epistemic concepts enter the characterization of reduction when the re...81%There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: scientific-reduction
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    Silberstein (2002), Sarkar (1992), Brigandt and Love (2012), and Hoyningen-Huene (1989) suggest another use of ‘epistemic reduction’: Reduction is epistemic iff its primary relata are representational in nature (and, hence, this use is equivalent to Van Gulick’s use of ‘representational reduction’ in 2001). Again this use seems motivated by the idea that epistemic concepts enter this characterization of reduction; for example, one might regard the very notion of a theory as an epistemic notion i
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit