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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Philosophical zombies (creatures physically identical to humans but lacking consciousness) are genuinely possible.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke's work on necessary a posteriori truths demonstrates.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Water being H2O is necessary but knowable only empirically, showing that physical-mental identity could be similarly necessary despite apparent conceivability gaps.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If consciousness is identical to a physical state, then a being physically identical to a human but lacking consciousness is no more genuinely possible than XYZ that is water but lacks hydrogen.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The argument from conceptual independence commits a use-mention fallacy: that physical concepts don't mention consciousness doesn't entail that the referents of those concepts are not identical to conscious states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Type-B physicalists like Ned Block and Joseph Levine grant an explanatory gap in concepts while denying any corresponding ontological gap in nature.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Zombie conceivability therefore tracks only our epistemic situation regarding mind-brain concepts, not a genuine metaphysical possibility in the world.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Physical science concepts such as neuron, cell, and muscle make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Physical science concepts are defined in purely physical terms in relevant science texts.
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    • 3.If the concepts used to describe a creature make no reference to consciousness, something could meet those conditions while lacking any connection to consciousness.
      ?

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