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    Player II can solve the game using backward induction onl... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Backward induction is self-undermining as a solution concept in certain extensive-form games

    Player II can solve the game using backward induction only by taking as a premise that Player I failed to behave in accordance with economic rationality

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    A solution method that requires a proposition and its negation as simultaneous p...Backward induction is self-undermining as a solution concept in certain extensiv...Backward induction requires that Player I know that Player II knows that Player ...

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    The NE outcome here is at the single leftmost node descending from node 8. To see this, backward induct again. At node 10, I would play L for a payoff of 3, giving II a payoff of 1. II can do better than this by playing L at node 9, giving I a payoff of 0. I can do better than this by playing L at node 8; so that is what I does, and the game terminates without II getting to move. A puzzle is then raised by Bicchieri (along with other authors, including Binmore (1987) and Pettit and Sugden (19

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