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    The problem with solving extensive-form games via Zermelo... — Carmelics
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    Supports→A player has no reason to play a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she expects other players to also play Nash equilibrium strategies.

    The problem with solving extensive-form games via Zermelo's algorithm generalizes beyond backward induction paradoxes.

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    A player has no reason to play a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she expects ot...Rational play of a Nash equilibrium strategy presupposes that other players will...

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    Rationality and common knowledge of rationality in extensive games doe...82%Backward induction is self-undermining as a solution concept in certai...82%The paradox of backward induction is primarily a problem for normative...82%Player II can solve the game using backward induction only by taking a...82%

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    Gintis (2009a) points out that the apparent paradox does not arise merely from our supposing that both players are economically rational. It rests crucially on the additional premise that each player must know, and reasons on the basis of knowing, that the other player is economically rational. This is the premise with which each player’s conjectures about what would happen off the equilibrium path of play are inconsistent. A player has reason to consider out-of-equilibrium possibilities if she

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