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    The paradox of backward induction is primarily a problem ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    The paradox of backward induction is primarily a problem for normative theories of rationality, not for non-psychological game theory

    Moral ResponsibilitySkepticism
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Non-psychological game theorists can account for apparently irrational play through empirical learning dynamics rather than normative rational requirements
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    • 2.The paradox of backward induction only generates a problem when game theory is viewed as contributing to a normative theory of strategic rationality
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Non-psychological game theory still presupposes solution concepts (e.g., subgame perfect equilibrium) that implicitly encode normative rationality assumptions.
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    • 2.Binmore's own defense of backward induction in evolutionary terms still requires agents to behave 'as if' rational at each node, preserving the normative paradox structurally.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Stalnaker and Reny demonstrate that backward induction requires common knowledge of rationality, a condition that is self-undermining at off-path nodes regardless of psychological interpretation.
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    • 2.If the paradox infects the epistemic foundations of any solution concept requiring sequential rationality, the psychological/non-psychological distinction cannot quarantine the problem.
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    Related

    Binmore's own defense of backward induction in evolutionary terms still requires...If the paradox infects the epistemic foundations of any solution concept requiri...Non-psychological game theorists can account for apparently irrational play thro...Non-psychological game theory still presupposes solution concepts (e.g., subgame...
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    Stalnaker and Reny demonstrate that backward induction requires common knowledge...The paradox of backward induction only generates a problem when game theory is v...

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    The paradox of backward induction only generates a problem when game t...96%Rationality and common knowledge of rationality in extensive games doe...86%Player II can solve the game using backward induction only by taking a...83%The common knowledge of rationality assumption used in backward induct...82%

    Source

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    SEP: game-theory
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    The paradox of backward induction, like the puzzles raised by equilibrium refinement, is mainly a problem for those who view game theory as contributing to a normative theory of rationality (specifically, as contributing to that larger theory the theory of strategic rationality). The non-psychological game theorist can give a different sort of account of apparently “irrational” play and the prudence it encourages. This involves appeal to the empirical fact that actual agents, including people, m
    Extraction notes

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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit