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    Probabilistic versions of abduction are either redundant ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Probabilistic versions of abduction are either redundant or probabilistically incoherent, and therefore irrational to follow.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Van Fraassen's 'best of a bad lot' objection shows IBE selects explanatorily best hypotheses only from those considered, not from all possible hypotheses.
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    • 2.Any probabilistic rule encoding 'explanatory virtue' as a likelihood boost must assign higher posteriors to hypotheses independent of their prior probability mass, violating the probability calculus.
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    • 3.Since no principled mapping exists from qualitative explanatory virtues to precise numerical likelihoods, probabilistic IBE introduces arbitrary parameters that Bayes' rule cannot absorb without distortion.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Howson and Urbach's formal Bayesian epistemology demonstrates that coherent belief revision is fully characterized by conditionalization, leaving no formal role for explanatory considerations as independent update triggers.
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    • 2.Any attempt by Lipton or Lycan to treat 'loveliness' as a probability-boosting factor beyond likelihood ratios generates violations of the ratio formula for conditional probability, as Salmon's confirmation theory makes explicit.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Probabilistic abduction rules must either amount to Bayes' rule or be at variance with it.
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    • 2.If a probabilistic abduction rule amounts to Bayes' rule, it is redundant.
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    • 3.If a probabilistic abduction rule is at variance with Bayes' rule, then by Lewis' dynamic Dutch book argument it is probabilistically incoherent.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Notable Defenders

    Bas van Fraassencontemporaryvan Fraassen 1989, Ch. 6
    David Lewiscontemporaryas reported in Teller 1973
    Paul TellercontemporaryTeller 1973

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Any attempt by Lipton or Lycan to treat 'loveliness' as a probability-boosting f...Any probabilistic rule encoding 'explanatory virtue' as a likelihood boost must ...Howson and Urbach's formal Bayesian epistemology demonstrates that coherent beli...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: abduction
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    The second objection, proffered in van Fraassen 1989 (Ch. 6), is levelled at probabilistic versions of abduction. The objection is that such rules must either amount to Bayes’ rule, and thus be redundant, or be at variance with it but then, on the grounds of Lewis’ dynamic Dutch book argument (as reported in Teller 1973), be probabilistically incoherent, meaning that they may lead one to assess as fair a number of bets which together ensure a financial loss, come what may; and, van Fraassen argu
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    If a probabilistic abduction rule amounts to Bayes' rule, it is redundant.
    +6 moreShow less
    If a probabilistic abduction rule is at variance with Bayes' rule, then by Lewis...It is irrational to follow a rule that can lead one to assess as fair a set of b...Probabilistic abduction rules must either amount to Bayes' rule or be at varianc...Probabilistic incoherence means the rule may lead one to assess as fair a set of...Since no principled mapping exists from qualitative explanatory virtues to preci...Van Fraassen's 'best of a bad lot' objection shows IBE selects explanatorily bes...

    Similar

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    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit