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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Russell can resist Moore's conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Moore's conclusion (5) follows only if premise (3) is accepted as stated
      ?

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    • 2.Russell can modify premise (3) — that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands — to block the inference
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that predicates with different meanings can co-refer to the same natural property.
      ?

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    • 2.If 'good' and a naturalistic predicate share the same referent despite differing in sense, Moore's open question only reveals a semantic gap, not a metaphysical one.
      ?

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    • 3.Russell's logicist framework already employs Fregean sense/reference distinctions, giving him principled resources to rebut the inference from conceptual openness to non-naturalism.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke and Putnam's posteriori identity theory shows that identity between properties can be necessary yet discoverable only empirically, not through conceptual analysis.
      ?

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    • 2.Moore's open question argument assumes that any genuine property identity must be transparent to competent speakers, an assumption the Kripke-Putnam framework independently refutes.
      ?

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    • 3.Russell, as an empiricist about ethics, can coherently hold that 'good' rigidly designates a natural property whose identity with goodness is a substantive discovery, not a conceptual truth.
      ?

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