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    Russell can resist Moore's conclusion that goodness is a ... — Carmelics
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    Russell can resist Moore's conclusion that goodness is a non-natural property

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that predicates with different meanings can co-refer to the same natural property.
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    • 2.If 'good' and a naturalistic predicate share the same referent despite differing in sense, Moore's open question only reveals a semantic gap, not a metaphysical one.
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    • 3.Russell's logicist framework already employs Fregean sense/reference distinctions, giving him principled resources to rebut the inference from conceptual openness to non-naturalism.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke and Putnam's posteriori identity theory shows that identity between properties can be necessary yet discoverable only empirically, not through conceptual analysis.
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    • 2.Moore's open question argument assumes that any genuine property identity must be transparent to competent speakers, an assumption the Kripke-Putnam framework independently refutes.
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    • 3.Russell, as an empiricist about ethics, can coherently hold that 'good' rigidly designates a natural property whose identity with goodness is a substantive discovery, not a conceptual truth.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Moore's conclusion (5) follows only if premise (3) is accepted as stated
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    • 2.Russell can modify premise (3) — that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands — to block the inference
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    Philosophy of Language2 linked

    Related

    Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that predicates with diffe...If 'good' and a naturalistic predicate share the same referent despite differing...Kripke and Putnam's posteriori identity theory shows that identity between prope...Moore's conclusion (5) follows only if premise (3) is accepted as stated
    +4 moreShow less
    Moore's open question argument assumes that any genuine property identity must b...Russell can modify premise (3) — that the meaning of a predicate is the property...Russell's logicist framework already employs Fregean sense/reference distinction...Russell, as an empiricist about ethics, can coherently hold that 'good' rigidly ...

    Similar

    There is no non-natural property of goodness91%Moore's open question argument fails to establish that goodness is not...84%Moral properties are not natural properties83%There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalis...83%

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    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
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    This brings us back to the Open Question Argument. So far as I can see, Russell continued to accept premises (1) and (2) and thus—with reservations—sub-conclusion (4). “Good” does not mean that same as any naturalistic predicate X—at least, it does not mean the same as any of the naturalistic predicates that have been suggested so far. But he also accepts something like premise (3), that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands. It was because he believed that some predicat
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    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit