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    Russell's Principia argument that descriptions such as 't... — Carmelics
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    Russell's Principia argument that descriptions such as 'the author of Waverly' have no meaning in isolation relies on a flawed assumption

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung shows that expressions have both a sense (mode of presentation) and a reference, which are irreducibly distinct semantic dimensions.
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    • 2.Definite descriptions like 'the author of Waverley' possess a determinate Sinn even when their Bedeutung is disputed or unknown, demonstrating meaning independent of denotation.
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    • 3.Russell's theory collapses Fregean sense into denotation, thereby presupposing the very monistic semantic framework that Jones's distinction between identity of meaning and identity of denotation was designed to refute.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.E.E. Constance Jones argued that the proposition expressed by 'Scott is the author of Waverley' is genuinely informative, which requires that 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverley' differ in cognitive meaning despite co-referring.
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    • 2.Russell's contextual elimination of descriptions in Principia cannot account for the epistemic asymmetry between knowing who Scott is and knowing that Scott wrote Waverley, a gap that requires irreducible intensional content.
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    • 3.If descriptions had meaning only in propositional context as Russell insists, substitution of co-denoting terms would preserve all semantic value, yet such substitutions demonstrably alter informational and cognitive content.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The Principia argument assumes that an expression can only possess one kind of meaning
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    • 2.If an expression can only possess one kind of meaning, then sameness of meaning must be either sameness of intension or sameness of denotation
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    • 3.This assumption is not obviously correct and is open to challenge
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Skepticism1 linked

    Related

    Definite descriptions like 'the author of Waverley' possess a determinate Sinn e...E.E. Constance Jones argued that the proposition expressed by 'Scott is the auth...Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung shows that expressions have both ...If an expression can only possess one kind of meaning, then sameness of meaning ...
    +5 moreShow less
    If descriptions had meaning only in propositional context as Russell insists, su...Russell's contextual elimination of descriptions in Principia cannot account for...Russell's theory collapses Fregean sense into denotation, thereby presupposing t...The Principia argument assumes that an expression can only possess one kind of m...This assumption is not obviously correct and is open to challenge

    Similar

    Russell's argument that 'the author of Waverley' lacks meaning is inva...90%If 'the author of Waverly' is a singular term with meaning in isolatio...86%The explanation of why 'the author of Waverly' denotes Scott is unsati...86%'The author of Waverly', if a meaningful singular term, has meaning in...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: emily-elizabeth-constance-jones
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    Jones seems to be perfectly correct here. The Principia argument intending to show that descriptions such as ‘the author of Waverly’ have no meaning in isolation assumes that an expression can only possess one kind of meaning—and thus that sameness of meaning is either sameness of intension or sameness of denotation—and Jones is quite right to challenge this. (But see Perkins 2011 both for an alternative reading of the text as well as a useful history of the debate surrounding its interpretation
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit