Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist accounts of belief that require a causal relationship between belief states and their behavioral manifestations.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Functionalism about belief requires a causal relationship between the belief state and its manifestations in behavior or other mental states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relationship causally.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Functionalism, as articulated by Lewis and Armstrong, defines mental states by their causal roles connecting stimuli, behavior, and other states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Ryle explicitly rejects inner causal states, treating dispositions as inference-licensing conditionals rather than causally efficacious entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A view that denies causal efficacy to belief states cannot satisfy the causal-role identity conditions that functionalism requires for belief individuation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Fodor's critique of behaviorism demonstrates that disposition-talk without causal underpinning fails to explain the productivity and systematicity of belief.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Rylean dispositions are defined purely by stimulus-response regularities, making them extensionally equivalent to behaviorism and thus subject to Fodor's causal objections.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.