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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Self-motion occurs in physical cases, not only in psychology — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
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    Self-motion occurs in physical cases, not only in psychology

    CausationFree Will & Foreknowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A falling object actively moves towards its goal
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    • 2.The motion of a falling object is caused by the object itself because the object is heavy
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    • 3.Any motion caused by the moving thing itself is an instance of self-motion
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's Physics distinguishes self-movers from things moved by their nature: heavy objects fall by external actualizing conditions, not internal agency.
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    • 2.The form 'heaviness' in a falling body is a passive potency actualized by removal of an obstacle, not an active principle initiating motion.
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    • 3.Without an internal active principle distinct from passive nature, attributing self-motion to falling bodies conflates accidental and essential causation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aquinas explicitly denies that natural motion in inanimate bodies is self-motion, reserving that category for living things with intrinsic motive principles.
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    • 2.If heaviness alone suffices for self-motion, then every object at rest on a surface is perpetually self-moving, which produces an absurd proliferation of agency.
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    Topics

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeCausation

    Related

    A falling object actively moves towards its goalAny motion caused by the moving thing itself is an instance of self-motionAquinas explicitly denies that natural motion in inanimate bodies is self-motion...Aristotle's Physics distinguishes self-movers from things moved by their nature:...
    +4 moreShow less
    If heaviness alone suffices for self-motion, then every object at rest on a surf...The form 'heaviness' in a falling body is a passive potency actualized by remova...The motion of a falling object is caused by the object itself because the object...Without an internal active principle distinct from passive nature, attributing s...

    Similar

    Bodily motion cannot directly act on the soul as a physical cause80%All physical movements can in principle be explained in terms of event...79%Some Scholastics, such as Buridan, held that motion is caused by a spe...79%Planetary motions are caused by a natural power internal to the compos...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: causation-medieval
    View source passageHide passage
    Scotus follows a modified Anselmian line, speaking of a single will, with two inclinations: one towards self-fulfillment, the other towards justice). It is the presence of these two inclinations which distinguishes willed causes from natural causes: natural causes are determined to perform their acts (unless impeded), whereas the will is not thus determined (Scotus, Metaphysics IV, 9: in Scotus, On the Will and Morality, pp. 136ff.; Lee 1998; Cross 1999, pp. 84ff.). The will is thus self-determi
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit