Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Skepticism about moral truth is distinct from all kinds o... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Skepticism about moral truth is distinct from all kinds of epistemological moral skepticism.

    Skepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Skepticism about moral truth does not imply skepticism about moral knowledge or skepticism about justified moral belief.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Some moral claims might be true even if we cannot know or have justified beliefs about which ones are true.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The implication between skepticism about moral truth and epistemological moral skepticism holds in only one direction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On epistemic accounts of truth (e.g., Putnam's internal realism), truth just is what idealized inquiry would converge on.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If truth is constitutively tied to ideal epistemic conditions, skepticism about moral truth entails skepticism about moral knowability.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, the claimed one-directional implication collapses for any truth-theory that grounds truth in epistemic accessibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mackie's error theory holds that moral claims purport to describe stance-independent facts, yet no such facts exist.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.On this view, the falsity of all moral claims is precisely what grounds our inability to have genuine moral knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The distinction between truth-skepticism and epistemological skepticism is therefore not robust under error-theoretic metaethics, where metaphysical and epistemic failure are co-extensive.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    If truth is constitutively tied to ideal epistemic conditions, skepticism about ...Mackie's error theory holds that moral claims purport to describe stance-indepen...On epistemic accounts of truth (e.g., Putnam's internal realism), truth just is ...On this view, the falsity of all moral claims is precisely what grounds our inab...
    +5 moreShow less
    Skepticism about moral truth does not imply skepticism about moral knowledge or ...Some moral claims might be true even if we cannot know or have justified beliefs...The distinction between truth-skepticism and epistemological skepticism is there...The implication between skepticism about moral truth and epistemological moral s...Therefore, the claimed one-directional implication collapses for any truth-theor...

    Similar

    The implication between skepticism about moral truth and epistemologic...93%Practical moral skepticism must not be confused with epistemological m...93%Skepticism about moral truth does not imply skepticism about moral kno...93%Practical moral skepticism does not imply epistemological moral skepti...91%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: skepticism-moral
    View source passageHide passage
    Error theorists and skeptics about moral truth-aptness disagree about the content of moral assertions, but they still agree that no substantive moral claim or belief is true, so they are both skeptics about moral truth. None of these skeptical theses is implied by either skepticism about moral knowledge or skepticism about justified moral belief. Some moral claims might be true, even if we cannot know or have justified beliefs about which ones are true. However, a converse implication seems to h
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit