Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Skepticism about moral truth is distinct from all kinds of epistemological moral skepticism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On epistemic accounts of truth (e.g., Putnam's internal realism), truth just is what idealized inquiry would converge on.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If truth is constitutively tied to ideal epistemic conditions, skepticism about moral truth entails skepticism about moral knowability.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, the claimed one-directional implication collapses for any truth-theory that grounds truth in epistemic accessibility.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mackie's error theory holds that moral claims purport to describe stance-independent facts, yet no such facts exist.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.On this view, the falsity of all moral claims is precisely what grounds our inability to have genuine moral knowledge.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The distinction between truth-skepticism and epistemological skepticism is therefore not robust under error-theoretic metaethics, where metaphysical and epistemic failure are co-extensive.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Skepticism about moral truth does not imply skepticism about moral knowledge or skepticism about justified moral belief.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Some moral claims might be true even if we cannot know or have justified beliefs about which ones are true.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The implication between skepticism about moral truth and epistemological moral skepticism holds in only one direction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.