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    Structural conditions like ethnic outbidding and security... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Yugoslavian and Rwandan disasters were not initially Prisoner's Dilemmas; most people on either side did not begin by preferring the destruction of the other group to mutual cooperation.

    Structural conditions like ethnic outbidding and security dilemmas generate incentive-compatible destruction preferences before overt violence begins.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.When groups compete for power in winner-take-all systems, each rationally prefers eliminating rivals' capacity to threaten them later.
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    • 2.Security dilemmas create situations where defensive preparations appear offensive to others, making preemptive strikes seem individually rational.
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    • 3.Ethnic outbidding incentivizes leaders to credibly signal commitment to group interests, making restraint appear as weakness or betrayal.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Structural incentives explain violence tendencies, not deterministic preferences—many groups facing identical conditions choose negotiation instead.
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    • 2.The claim conflates 'destruction preferences' with strategic positioning; actors may pursue dominance through non-violent means when available.
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    • 3.Empirical cases show institutions, leadership choices, and contingent events often override structural incentives, limiting predictive power of this model.
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    Democracy & Governance1 linkedJustice & Punishment1 linked

    Related

    Empirical cases show institutions, leadership choices, and contingent events oft...Ethnic outbidding incentivizes leaders to credibly signal commitment to group in...Security dilemmas create situations where defensive preparations appear offensiv...Structural incentives explain violence tendencies, not deterministic preferences...
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    The Yugoslavian and Rwandan disasters were not initially Prisoner's Dilemmas; mo...The claim conflates 'destruction preferences' with strategic positioning; actors...When groups compete for power in winner-take-all systems, each rationally prefer...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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