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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Bayesian account of evidential support extends the hypothetical-deductive approach to cover cases where a hypothesis does not deductively entail or preclude an evidential outcome, but instead assigns a probability to that outcome

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The assignment of prior probabilities P[h_i | b] lacks an objective foundation, making Bayesian 'extension' of HD-confirmation an artifact of subjective credences rather than evidential logic.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Popper and Miller (1983) demonstrated that probabilistic support cannot decompose into genuinely independent inductive increments, undermining the claim that Bayesian updating constitutes a principled generalization of deductive confirmation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.For a hypothesis to assign a determinate probability r to an outcome, it must already presuppose a well-defined probability space, yet specifying that space typically requires background commitments that are themselves empirically contentious.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The HD approach derives its normative force from the necessity of deductive consequence, and replacing entailment with stipulated likelihoods dissolves rather than extends that force, yielding a different epistemic framework, not a generalization of it.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The hypothetical-deductive approach is limited to cases where h_i·b·c ⊨ e or h_i·b·c ⊨ ~e holds
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Many scientific hypotheses neither deductively entail nor preclude evidential outcomes, but instead imply that outcomes are more or less likely to some specific degree r
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The Bayesian approach handles cases where P[e | h_i·b·c] = r for some value r between 0 and 1, generalizing deductive entailment as a special case
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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