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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The belief that we are endowed with power to produce our ... — Carmelics
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The belief that we are endowed with power to produce our own actions is a first principle

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.We naturally and non-inferentially believe ourselves to be endowed with power to produce our own actions
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    • 2.Various activities in which we engage would make no sense if we did not believe ourselves to be endowed with power to produce our own actions
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    • 3.The activity of deliberating — weighing reasons for and against various possible actions — proceeds under the assumption that we have power to produce our own actions
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.The phenomenology of deliberation is compatible with determinism, as Hume argued: we deliberate because we are ignorant of causes, not because we are uncaused.
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    • 2.A belief that is psychologically necessary does not thereby track metaphysical reality, as even Reid concedes that some instinctive beliefs can mislead us about the external world.
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    • 3.If the compulsive deliberator under hypnotic suggestion experiences genuine deliberative phenomenology yet lacks libertarian freedom, phenomenology underdetermines the power Reid claims it establishes.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Derk Pereboom's 'hard incompatibilist' position shows that reactive attitudes and deliberative practices can be revised and retained without presupposing agent-causal power.
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    • 2.Reid's inference from 'deliberation presupposes belief in power' to 'we actually possess such power' commits a genetic fallacy: the evolutionary or social utility of a belief cannot vindicate its truth.
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    Topics

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    A belief that is psychologically necessary does not thereby track metaphysical r...Derk Pereboom's 'hard incompatibilist' position shows that reactive attitudes an...If the compulsive deliberator under hypnotic suggestion experiences genuine deli...If we did not believe we had power to produce our own actions, we would not both...
    +5 moreShow less
    Reid's inference from 'deliberation presupposes belief in power' to 'we actually...The activity of deliberating — weighing reasons for and against various possible...The phenomenology of deliberation is compatible with determinism, as Hume argued...Various activities in which we engage would make no sense if we did not believe ...We naturally and non-inferentially believe ourselves to be endowed with power to...

    Similar

    We naturally and non-inferentially believe ourselves to be endowed wit...82%Many of our own acts are known with certainty equal to first principle...80%The first principle is the starting point from which the entire philos...80%The Principle of Consciousness is supposed to be the first principle o...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reid
    View source passageHide passage
    The first argument for moral liberty parallels Reid's response to external world skepticism (see 3.5 Responding to Skepticism about the External World, above). Reid claims that the belief that we are endowed with power to produce our own actions is a first principle and then employs his general form of defense of first principles in order to argue that it must be so. We naturally and non-inferentially believe ourselves to be endowed with power since various activities in which we engage would ma
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit