The claim that the separatist about grounding explanation incurs no new debt is undermined by the fact that the quasi-causal model is not the only model of metaphysical explanation.
Grounding explanation(Contrasted with grounding as a metaphysical relation)
A form of metaphysical explanation in which facts about what grounds what back or underwrite explanatory claims, modeled in part on the quasi-causal structure of causal explanation.
Incurs a debt(as used in logical argumentation)
Takes on a burden or obligation—here meaning a philosophical problem that needs to be solved or explained.
Quasi-causal model(as used in metaphysics)
A framework for explaining things that works somewhat like causal explanation (cause and effect) but isn't quite the same thing.
Separatist (about grounding explanation)(as used in metaphysics)
A philosophical position that treats explanations about why things exist or have properties as completely separate from causal explanations (explanations about why events happen).
metaphysical explanation(At least three varieties are distinguished in recent literature regarding how property-sharing explains resemblance)
An explanation of why a fact obtains in terms of what grounds or accounts for it at the level of fundamental reality, not merely causal or logical explanation
Following Raven (2015), who applies the terminology to grounding and grounding explanations in particular, approaches to this fundamental question might be classified with regard to whether they take a “unionist” or “separatist” line. Standardly, unionism about grounding and grounding explanation is the thesis that they are one: to be grounded just is to be metaphysically explained in a distinctive way (e.g., Dasgupta 2014; Jenkins 2013; Litland 2013, 2017; Raven 2012; Rosen 2010; Thompson 2016)
Extraction notes
Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks