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    The common-sense concept of 'possible' (whatever does not... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    The common-sense concept of 'possible' (whatever does not conflict with human concepts) cannot be Descartes' view of genuine possibility.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.For Descartes, God's omnipotence is the ultimate ground of possibility, not human conceptual consistency (AT VII 432).
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    • 2.Human concepts are finite and can fail to detect contradictions that God's intellect recognizes, making them unreliable guides to genuine possibility.
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    • 3.A standard grounded in human conceptual non-contradiction would make modal facts dependent on human cognition, violating Descartes' doctrine that eternal truths are created by God independently of any mind.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Descartes explicitly distinguishes what is 'morally impossible' or merely practically inconceivable from what is metaphysically impossible in his correspondence with More (AT V 272).
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    • 2.Leibniz's later critique of Cartesian modality confirms that genuine possibility requires more than logical consistency within human concepts—it requires grounding in a divine intellect or essence.
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    • 3.If common-sense conceivability sufficed for genuine Cartesian possibility, the deceiving-God hypothesis would be genuinely possible, yet Descartes treats its eventual impossibility as a metaphysical, not merely conceptual, result.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Descartes holds that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true.
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    • 2.Truth is the conformity of thought with its object.
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    • 3.Mere conceptual non-contradiction does not guarantee a corresponding object in reality.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Perception1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A standard grounded in human conceptual non-contradiction would make modal facts...Descartes explicitly distinguishes what is 'morally impossible' or merely practi...Descartes holds that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true.For Descartes, God's omnipotence is the ultimate ground of possibility, not huma...
    +6 moreShow less
    Genuine possibilities in Descartes' system must be clearly and distinctly percei...Human concepts are finite and can fail to detect contradictions that God's intel...If common-sense conceivability sufficed for genuine Cartesian possibility, the d...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: descartes-modal
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    These alleged possibilities (if they are anything) would be among all of the other creatures; they would be actuals. It might of course be the case that Descartes just insists that there are possible existents in addition to actual existents. Alternately, it might be the case that like Spinoza (in Ethics Part IV, definitions three and four), Descartes uses the expression “possible existence” to describe actually-existing creatures, and in a way that is consistent with a denial of non-actual rea
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Leibniz's later critique of Cartesian modality confirms that genuine possibility...
    Mere conceptual non-contradiction does not guarantee a corresponding object in r...
    Truth is the conformity of thought with its object.
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit