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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The conceivability argument does not definitively refute all reasons for believing in mind-body dependence.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Chalmers' conceivability argument establishes that zombies are ideally conceivable, which entails metaphysical possibility by the modal logic S5.
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    • 2.If a world without phenomenal consciousness but with identical physical structure is metaphysically possible, then consciousness cannot be logically entailed by physical states.
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    • 3.Any purported reason for mind-body dependence that conflicts with this modal result must either deny S5 or show ideal conceivability fails, not merely invoke contested concepts.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's argument in Naming and Necessity demonstrates that apparent contingency between mental and physical states cannot be explained away as mere epistemic illusion, unlike the heat-molecular motion case.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Because pain and its phenomenal character are identical by rigid designation if at all, there is no analogous 'appearance of contingency' to explain away, undermining posteriori identity defenses.
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    • 3.Therefore, the conceivability argument's force against mind-body dependence is not merely one consideration among others but exposes a structural disanalogy that defeats the most sophisticated identity-theoretic responses.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Many concepts in the philosophy of mind remain contested.
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    • 2.There may be other reasons for believing in mind-body dependence beyond those addressed by the conceivability argument.
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    • 3.The conceivability argument does not pre-empt claims about dependence as they arise.
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