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    The counterfactual account of proposition truth-condition... — Carmelics
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    The counterfactual account of proposition truth-conditions fails for propositions that are too complex for any finite mind to grasp.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Gödel's incompleteness theorems establish that arithmetic contains truths no finite formal system can prove, implying some propositions transcend all finite cognitive reach.
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    • 2.A counterfactual conditioned on an impossible antecedent ('were someone to token P') is vacuously true of any consequent, yielding indeterminate rather than determinate truth-conditions.
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    • 3.Determinate truth-conditions require non-vacuous grounding; vacuously true counterfactuals cannot distinguish true propositions from false ones in the ungrasped domain.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's context principle requires that propositional senses exist independently of any cognitive act of grasping, making tokenability irrelevant to propositional identity.
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    • 2.If propositional truth-conditions depend on possible tokening acts, then Fregean sense-independent propositions — accepted widely in anti-psychologistic semantics — are left without truth-conditions by the counterfactual account.
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    • 3.Any account that systematically fails to assign truth-conditions to a recognized class of propositions endorsed by the dominant tradition is explanatorily deficient on its own semantic terms.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Hanks's counterfactual response grounds truth-conditions in possible tokens: a proposition is true iff, were someone to token it, that token would be true under the relevant conditions.
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    • 2.Some propositions — such as mathematical truths too complicated for any finite mind to grasp — have no possible tokens, not even counterfactual ones.
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    • 3.If there are no possible tokens, the counterfactual account provides no truth-conditions for those propositions.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A counterfactual conditioned on an impossible antecedent ('were someone to token...Any account that systematically fails to assign truth-conditions to a recognized...Determinate truth-conditions require non-vacuous grounding; vacuously true count...Frege's context principle requires that propositional senses exist independently...
    +5 moreShow less
    Gödel's incompleteness theorems establish that arithmetic contains truths no fin...Hanks's counterfactual response grounds truth-conditions in possible tokens: a p...If propositional truth-conditions depend on possible tokening acts, then Fregean...If there are no possible tokens, the counterfactual account provides no truth-co...Some propositions — such as mathematical truths too complicated for any finite m...

    Similar

    Hanks's counterfactual response grounds truth-conditions in possible t...83%Some propositions — such as mathematical truths too complicated for an...82%Bolzano's truth condition requires the subject idea of a proposition t...80%Strong supervenience of having-asserted-a-true-proposition on proposit...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: propositions
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    A concern for the type view is whether there will be “missing propositions” — truths or falsehoods which have never been entertained. One drawn to the type view may allow for the existence of uninstantiated types to account for the existence of these propositions. However, given that propositions are claimed to derive their representational features from their tokens, such uninstantiated types would lack representational features, and so lack truth-conditions. Hanks suggests dealing with such
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit