The divine aspect of both Forrest's and Pfeifer's pantheisms is implausible, because the consciousness attributable to the universe falls far short of what is required for divinity.
A philosopher who argues that the universe could possess intentionality through supervenience (emerging from underlying features).
Pfeifer(contemporary philosophy of mind)
A philosopher who argues that the universe could possess intentionality as an intrinsic (built-in) feature.
consciousness(Philosophy of mind; framing the 'What is consciousness?' question)
A dynamic process characterized by self-transforming flow, intentional coherence, and semantic self-understanding, rather than a static or momentary state.
divinity(Bishop and Perszyk's usage within the euteleological model)
The property or activity of being the supreme good; on the euteleological model, not a substance or person but a quality instantiable by concrete occasions of love.
implausible(the philosophical claim being evaluated as unlikely)
Not believable or reasonable; difficult to accept as true based on logic or evidence.
pantheism(One interpretation of Spinoza's identification of God with the one substance)
The view that God and Nature are identical, with the universe itself being divine
On the other end of the spectrum from these varieties of theistic dualism, we find pantheism, the species of monism that takes the One to be God (a general model, 13). All monisms face a problem of unity: how are the many things in the world integrated enough to call them One? But pantheisms face an additional problem of divinity: even if all is truly One, does the One have what it takes to be God? Here we will focus on two contemporary pantheisms, both in Buckareff & Nagasawa (2016): what w
Extraction notes
Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks