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    The divine nature is not a fourth substance numerically d... — Carmelics
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    The divine nature is not a fourth substance numerically distinct from the three Persons

    Trinity
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The divine nature is numerically the same substance as each of the three Persons
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    • 2.If it were a fourth distinct substance, it could not be numerically the same as each of the three
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On realist universals ontology, a shared nature constitutes a genuine ontological entity distinct from its particular instances.
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    • 2.If the divine nature is a real universal fully instantiated by three distinct persons, it functions as a fourth ontological item in the divine inventory.
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    • 3.Denying the divine nature is a fourth substance requires abandoning realist universals, but Trinitarian theology historically relies on realist ontology to explain shared essence.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.John Philoponus argued that substances individuated by distinct properties are numerically distinct substances, making the three Persons three distinct substances.
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    • 2.If each Person fully possesses the divine nature as their own substance, the divine nature is multiply instantiated rather than numerically singular.
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    • 3.A numerically singular nature shared across three individuals collapses into either modalism or an uninstantiated abstract fourth entity, on standard mereological accounts.
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    Trinity

    Related

    A numerically singular nature shared across three individuals collapses into eit...Denying the divine nature is a fourth substance requires abandoning realist univ...If each Person fully possesses the divine nature as their own substance, the div...If it were a fourth distinct substance, it could not be numerically the same as ...
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    If the divine nature is a real universal fully instantiated by three distinct pe...John Philoponus argued that substances individuated by distinct properties are n...On realist universals ontology, a shared nature constitutes a genuine ontologica...The divine nature is numerically the same substance as each of the three Persons

    Similar

    The divine nature is not a fourth Person of the Trinity94%The divine nature is numerically the same substance as each of the thr...92%The divine nature is not absolutely identical to any of the three divi...87%The divine nature is a simple substance and a property, not a hylomorp...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: trinity
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    Similarly, the Persons of the Trinity are so many selves constituted by the same stuff (or something analogous to a stuff). These selves, like the lump and statue, are numerically the same without being identical, but they don’t stand in a relation of accidental sameness, as they could not fail to be related in this way. Father, Son, and Spirit are three quasi form-matter compounds. The forms are properties like “being the Father, being the Son, and being the Spirit; or perhaps being Unbegotten,
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit