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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The essences of natural kinds need be neither intrinsic nor possessed by all and only members of those kinds.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke and Putnam established that natural kind terms are rigid designators picking out kinds by their intrinsic microstructural properties.
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    • 2.If kind membership is fixed by rigid designation to intrinsic structure, then essences must be intrinsic to ground the reference relation itself.
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    • 3.A theory of essence that severs the link between intrinsic properties and kind membership undermines the semantic stability that makes natural kind terms informative across possible worlds.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Brian Ellis's scientific essentialism holds that the causal powers constituting a natural kind's essence are universally and necessarily instantiated by every member of that kind.
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    • 2.If essences were not universally shared by all members, the modal necessity distinguishing genuine natural kinds from merely nominal or conventional kinds would collapse.
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    • 3.Without universal instantiation of intrinsic essences, there is no principled basis for distinguishing natural kinds from interest-relative groupings, undermining the realist commitments motivating natural kind theory.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation.
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    • 2.Generalisations supporting induction and explanation need not be exceptionless.
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    • 3.Essences that are intrinsic and universally shared by all and only members are not required for inductive and explanatory roles.
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